Indirect use of force for unity of Sudan

By Jacob K. Lupai
August 17, 2009 — The Sudan has never been a united country based on the free will of its people particularly those from the south. The British and the Egyptians erroneously created an artificial unity of Sudan for their own ulterior motives with no consideration for the southern part of the country. However, more importantly the unity of Sudan was falsified by the Arab element of Sudan specifically for the exploitation of the abundant resources in the south. Northern nationalism was mistaken for Sudanese nationalism.
To galvanise Arab support the world over and to legitimise marginalisation of the African element of Sudan, the Arab element used a carefully crafted ploy in propagating Sudanese nationalism predicated upon Arabism and Islam. Even the African element in the north that had converted to Islam and influenced by a little bit of Arab culture, succumbed to such a deceitful ploy. Nonetheless as falsehood does not stand the test of time Darfur in the west, a deeply Islamic region and of predominantly African population, is in flames. This is a clear message to those hypocrites who use the Islamic card to dupe others in the grand plan to marginalise the racially different fellow citizens. God forbid but the Sudan may be heading towards an inferno.
The south was the only region in the Sudan that decisively challenged the post independent successive northern dominated governments for equality through a federal system. This was, however, rejected outright and it became a crime to talk of a federal system for the Sudan. It is important to mark that the overwhelming majority of northern political parties were and are Islamists that participated in varying degrees in the brutal suppression of the aspirations of the south for equality. The south reacted with defiance and the successive Islamist governments of Sudan counteracted with unprecedented brutality. The message was that the south’s aspirations could only be realised through the barrel of the gun. The south stood up tall and waged a protracted war of liberation that sent chilling messages across the Islamists. The Islamists brutal force failed miserably to cow the south into submission. It is important to note that the federal system the south had proposed half a century ago is now widely applied by the Islamists as an acceptable system of administration of the Sudan. While the Islamists have climbed down from their imaginary grandeur the south is climbing up to achieve what is a taboo to the Islamists.
Unable to win a decisive battle over the south for a complete subjugation, the north suspended military operations through what became known as the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 that granted the south a federal status similar to the one the south had initially demanded as a condition for unity of Sudan. The south had fought for 17 years (1955-1972) before the north could admit the futility of war against the south’s legitimate aspirations. It then took the south 10 years of relative peace before another war broke out again when the Addis Ababa Agreement was abrogated. The north found it easier to abrogate the agreement because the visionless southern leadership had engaged in diabolical tribalism instead of concentrating on development and fairness for all as peace dividends.
The south did not go down quietly after the abrogation of the peace agreement. It responded decisively with the formation of a dynamic guerrilla army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) that the north found it a force to reckon with. There were theories as to how the formation of such a guerrilla army could have been so rapid with such spectacular advances against the enemy in the battle field. One theory was that with the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement many saw their tribal hegemony substantially weakened and therefore flocked in droves to join the SPLA. Another theory was that others saw an opportunity for the realisation of an independent south and the others who joined the SPLA were simply opportunists pursuing purely personal interest. However, whatever theory was plausible is immaterial. The fact was that the south responded decisively and called for unity of Sudan on new basis. With the call for unity of Sudan one would have expected the north to respond enthusiastically with a popular support for the SPLA and an uprising similar to that of 1985 that overthrew the May revolutionary government of Gaafer el Numeiri. However, as the minds of the majority of the people in the north were grounded on the concept of unity of Sudan as an Arab Islamic state it was virtually impossible for the north to accept the call of unity on a new basis. This was especially when the call for unity on new basis was from a non Arab and non Muslim Sudanese, and worse from a southerner. This may explain the length of resistance against the SPLA by the north (1983-2005). However, the SPLA was too strong to be defeated by the Islamists in the battle field.
The call for unity of Sudan on new basis attracted revolutionaries countrywide. The call appealed to the marginalised in the north and people of good will who had perceived the injustices perpetrated by the inconsiderate Islamists. The evidence was the tumultuous reception in Khartoum by Sudanese of all walks of life accorded to the commander-in-chief of the SPLA that had brought hope to millions. The estimated crowd was over 3 million people. No Sudanese Arab Islamic leader had ever been received at Khartoum International Airport like the commander-in-chief of the SPLA. Truly the Sudan would have been a united country on new basis in the best interest of Sudan’s diversities. However, the racists and religious bigots with misplaced superiority complex and greed couldn’t allow that to happen.
The Islamists were no fools. They only signed what became known as comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2005 under a sustained pressure by the SPLA and the international community. The war was not yet over. The Islamists might have lost the battle but not the war. First the commander-in-chief of the SPLA lost his life in mysterious circumstances in a helicopter crash which sent the wrong signal to the Islamists. Secondly the Islamists were not anyway keen on the implementation of the CPA as it was a ploy to buy time. Thirdly the Islamists are already fuelling tribal conflicts in the south. The SPLA spokesman was very clear when confidently cited accounts of mysterious weapons being dropped for setting southerners against each other to undermine their unity for strength. Fourthly the Islamists are at least honest in their open expression of rejection of an independent south. This leads to one thing that is clear. The Islamists are preparing for a proxy war as the first option in their arsenal of options to maintain the unity of Sudan at all cost. The Sudan is surely on the way to disintegration.
The Islamists want by any means the result of the referendum in 2011 to be 75 per cent for the south to qualify for independence. The implication is that the south would remain part of Old Sudan with less than 75 per cent of the referendum result for independence. The message also is that if the south declares independence on the strength of the referendum result of 51 per cent the Islamists may consider this a rebellion which may prompt an invasion and occupation of the south by the north. Alternatively the Islamists may intensify the indirect use of force to impose unity. Senior Islamists have already declared they will make it very difficult for the south to be an independent sovereign state. This means the Islamists will do whatever in their power to maintain the unity of Sudan by all means possible. The message is very clear. It is here that the unity of the people of southern Sudan is critical to protect themselves from devastating destruction by the Islamists. There is no short cut to independence as the experience of East Timor seems to have shown.
In conclusion it is not warmongering but war is inevitable despite the diplomatic niceties of no return to war. The indirect use of force by the north is already evident and it may be full blown with the southern declaration of independence. The Islamists are frightened of losing their grip on power because independence to the south may be a threat. An independent south is likely to be sympathetic to secularists and the marginalised in the north and this is something the Islamist dread. The Islamists may also have some sleepless nights because they are aware that whether they use indirect force, rig the referendum result or declare an open war on the south, independence to the south is unstoppable. The marginalised would prefer independence to second class citizenship in their own place of birth.
The author is a regular contributor to Sudan Tribune and can be reached at [email protected]